French neoliberalism split into administrative and radical faces that mutually supported each other

Evidence

This radicalization explains why neoliberalism is often presented in France as if it were a foreign extremist discourse, imported from Great Britain or the United States, and appearing de novo in the 1970–1980s. The New Economist doctrine is, however, the product of a longer history that is partly French and that shows a whole sequence of transformations: those concerning the role of the state and its structures, as well as those of the economic doctrines that took part in this evolution. By reinstalling the state in the liberal theory, neoliberalism offered to its advocates a pragmatist solution to the crisis, especially because its competitors (planning, corporatism) could appear utopian. World War II helped discredit the corporatist hypothesis. With the Liberation, the building of a planned economy, combined with preservation of the principle of the market economy, placed neoliberals in a difficult position. They were faced with a Hobson’s choice: either to justify state interventionism or to preach a return to laissez-faire. This second solution was undoubtedly the most intellectually coherent, but just like the left-wing critical discourses of the 1930s, it had the drawback of possessing a certain utopian character. Thus neoliberalism could adopt two very different faces: an administrative face, accepting the compromises and conquering power between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s; and a more radical face, benefiting from the failures of the first version of neoliberalism to overcome the crises of the 1970s, but also from the political victory of the socialists in 1981, which produced a strong electric shock for the right wing. These two versions of neoliberalism supported each other. The durability of the bureaucratic structures inherited from the Liberation masked the progress of the liberal ideas in the area of power. The neoliberal extremism of the 1980s ushered in privatization and deregulation and permitted right-wing politicians to acknowledge their fundamental adherence to neoliberalism. — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 301

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the broader Mont Pèlerin Society history and to later reading on how the administrative/radical split recurs across national contexts (e.g., German ordoliberalism vs. Chicago school). — connects to: Cold War polarization radicalized French neoliberalism and narrowed its earlier cross-class audience. — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 273; French trade union leaders joined neoliberal circles to fight communist influence — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 282; French employer organizations held radically divergent versions of postwar liberalism — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 290 (+5 more)
• DEFINE: Useful definition of French neoliberalism’s dual character as administrative vs. radical.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 301

Broader Connections

• Governance only became neoliberalism’s administrative form after converging with it #corroborates (0.85) — Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos, 232
• Neoliberalism is internally plural yet not formless #corroborates (0.80) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 10
• Neoliberalism operates from a unified playbook despite surface variation #qualifies (0.75) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 917