Freedom as non-domination yields benefits beyond those of non-interference.

Evidence

Almost everyone assumes that freedom as non-interference is a good. It is the sort of thing that anyone will desire for themselves and, generalizing to the case of others, will admit as desirable for anyone. I go along with that assumption, and I intend to argue for the value of freedom as non-domination—to argue for its status as a personal good— by showing how well it compares with the other sort of freedom in various regards. I will argue, in particular, that it compares very favourably with freedom as non-interference in its claim to be an instrumental good: a good that generates other benefits for the individual who enjoys it. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 407

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Providing mobility to the disabled expands freedom even absent any domination — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 379; Freedom can be reconceived as non-domination rather than non-interference or self-mastery — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 1207; Freedom as non-domination differs from non-interference by targeting the mere capacity for arbitrary interference. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 434 (+9 more)

Broader Connections