Free-riders are exposed when individual contributions to a public pool are made visible.

Evidence

For the public goods game'4, all six players were asked simultaneously whether they would contribute DM 2.50 to the public pool, the contents of which would then be doubled and redistributed evenly among all players irrespective of whether they had contributed. After all players had decided, each player's decision (yes or no), his/her contribution (that is, DM 2.50 or 0), and his/her gain (for example, DM 4.17 if all but one had contributed), was displayed below the pseudonames for 20 s. — <cite>Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the tragedy of…, 32

Categorization

• XREF: The design — visible contribution then public redistribution — mirrors the farewell dinner for Ellen Olenska as a collective sanction executed via micro-behaviors, where non-conformity leads to instant social exile.