Foreign investor ownership rises even in concentrated-ownership economies

Evidence

One important dimension of the growing importance of financial markets is the degree of foreign ownership of domestic firms within a political economy. Empirical evidence reveals that even in political economies with relatively small stock markets and traditions of concentrated ownership like France or Germany, the ownership stakes of foreign investors are on the rise. — Natascha van der Zwan, Making Sense of Financialization, 89

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to work on financialization of France/Germany — e.g. Morin on the ‘financialization of capitalism’ in French firms. — connects to: Institutional investors’ cross-ownership creates anticompetitive power needing limits — Andrew deWaard, Derivative Media: How Wall Street…, 1384; Common ownership of competing firms suppresses competition and inflates prices; Neoliberals viewed foreign investment as inseparable from exporting capitalist social transformation — Jessica Whyte, The Morals of the Market: Human Rights…, 298 (+2 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Natascha van der Zwan, Making Sense of Financialization, 89

Related

• Big firms attract more credit and state support, reinforcing concentration. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Neoliberal property rights justify imposing governance structures for foreign investors. #expands (0.78) — Jessica Whyte, The Morals of the Market, 51
• Neoliberals viewed foreign investment as inseparable from exporting capitalist social transformation #expands (0.75) — Jessica Whyte, The Morals of the Market, 298
• Institutional investors’ cross-ownership creates anticompetitive power needing limits #complicates (0.72) — Andrew deWaard, Derivative Media, 1384
• Common ownership of competing firms suppresses competition and inflates prices #complicates (0.72)
• Big firms attract more credit and state support, reinforcing concentration. #expands (0.72) — Clara E. Mattei, Escape from Capitalism, 134