For Sartre a thing’s qualities constitute the thing itself, not subjective additions

Evidence

Th e yellow of the lemon … is not a subjective mode of apprehending the lemon; it is the lemon… . Th e whole lemon extends throughout its qualities and … each one of the qualities is spread over the others; that is what we have correctly called “this.” — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 361

Categorization

• DEFINE: Illuminates Sartre’s notion of the ‘this’ — a totality where every quality spreads over all the others.
• SEED: The lemon passage is a vivid, compact illustration of anti-subjectivist phenomenology usable in an essay on sensory experience.
• XREF: connects to: Perceived qualities exist objectively as the thing itself, not as subjective effects — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 594; The For-itself is responsible for how it apprehends qualities of things — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 598; Sartre denies any phenomenal-noumenal distinction in being

Broader Connections

• The For-itself is responsible for how it apprehends qualities of things #expands (0.82) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 598
• Sartre denies any phenomenal-noumenal distinction in being #corroborates (0.75)