Following a rule is practice mastery, not interpretation of a theory.

Evidence

As a consequence, notes Tully, a general rule cannot ‘account for precisdy the phenomenon we associate with understanding the meaning of a general term: the ability to use a general term, as well as to question its accepted use, in various circumstances without recursive doubts’ . This should lcad us to abandon thc idea that the rulc and its interprctation ‘determinc meaning’ and to recognize that understanding a gencral term does not consist in grasping a thcory but coincides with the ability of using it in diffcrent circumstances. For Wittgenstdn, ‘obcying a rulc’ is a practice and our understanding of rules consists in the mastery of a techniquc. The use of general terms is therefore to be seen as intersub;ectivc ‘practiccs’ or ‘customs’ not that different from games like chess or tcnnis. This is why Wittgenstcin insists that it is a mistake to cnvisage evcry action according to a rulc as an ‘intcrpretation’ and that ‘thcre is a way of grasping a rulc which is not an inttrpmalion. but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rulc” and “going against it” in actual cases’. 19 Tully considers that thc wide-ranging consequences of this point are missed whcn onc affirms. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 332

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Mastering a theory’s principles alone does not ensure correct application; Subjectivity forms through practice, not prior to it. — Yael Arbell, The Circle of Commoning:
, 85; Theory must prove itself theoretically rather than gesture toward practice — Dirk Braunstein, Adorno’s Critique of Political Economy, 1202 (+9 more)

Broader Connections