Fiduciary duties respond to generic trustee opportunities for abuse through custody, access, and expertise.
Evidence
The most basic fiduciary norms, those that are enunciated in ethics codes, standards of practice, regulatory statutes, judicial decisions, and the like, respond to the generic structural opportunities for abuse available to trustees of all sorts that arise from their custody of and discretion over property and opportunity, their special access to information, and their expertise (Abbott 1983). … Disinterested trustees are expected to place the interests of those they represent over their own, to deal at arm’s length and disqualify themselves from agency relationships that create conflicts of interest, to limit their compensation and other position-related benefits, and to refrain from self-dealing (exercising legitimate discretion for personal advantage)20-and, of course, from misappropriating the assets or property of which they have custody. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 66
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines ‘self-dealing’ as exercising legitimate discretion for personal advantage—a precise legal term.
- XREF: connects to: Guardians of trust are themselves positioned to abuse the trust placed in them. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 112; Controlling trust creates new opportunities for abuse in an inflationary spiral. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 145
Related
- Guardians of trust are themselves positioned to abuse the trust placed in them. (similarity 0.84)
- Mechanisms for controlling impersonal trust themselves create new opportunities for abuse (similarity 0.81)
Broader Connections
- Guardians of trust are themselves positioned to abuse the trust placed in them.
#corroborates(0.85) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 112 - Controlling trust creates new opportunities for abuse in an inflationary spiral.
#expands(0.75) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 145