Federal environmental dominance flowed from state-capture and race-to-the-bottom fears plus lobbying economies of scale.

Evidence

No doubt, however, the primary impetus for the federal government’s taking a dominant position in environmental protection came from those favoring more, rather than less, regulation. The most oft-stated concern of those advocating a strong federal role was that the states were less likely to enact tough environmental pollution control laws. The reasons were several. First, the state governments were likely to be sensitive to complaints made by local industry about the costs of pollution control and, therefore, less likely to possess the political will needed to impose and maintain those controls. For similar reasons, states might engage in a “race to the bottom,” competing for new industry by imposing less demanding environmental controls than neighboring states. Finally, at least for many in the emerging environmental public interest community, there were decided practical advantages to a national focus. It was far easier for an environmental organization to concentrate its limited resources on lobbying efforts before Congress or a federal agency than to mount such an effort in each state. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 423

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distills the ‘race to the bottom’ rationale that underpins federal preemption arguments.
• XREF: connects to: Bipartisan competition and industry preference for uniformity drove 1970s federal environmental law. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 261

Broader Connections

• Bipartisan competition and industry preference for uniformity drove 1970s federal environmental law. #corroborates (0.82) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 261