Expulsion-based enforcement fails when members lack stake in readmission.
Evidence
In general, the Board of Arbitrators uses suspension more frequently than expulsion to secure compliance with its decisions. Expulsion presents a classic end-game problem. The expelled member may feel like he has nothing to loose by challening the club-he can try to upset the board’s decision in court, file a private antitrust suit, or sue in tort for interference with business relations. The bylaws, however, provide that a member who was suspended or expelled may be readmitted after two years on the same terms as a new member. Although this provision appears to be a partial solution to the end-game problem, due to the long waiting list of those already qualified for club membership and the subjectivity of the admissions process, dealers are not routinely readmitted under this provision. Furthermore, even if the admissions committee voted to readmit a dealer, his ability to avoid being shunned would depend on the original reason for his expulsion. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 106
Categorization
- XREF: Directly illustrates the third-party enforcement problem from the reader’s stated purpose: suspension, not expulsion, preserves the member’s stake so the club’s sanction retains bite — the inverse of why expulsion fails Bellodi’s case. — connects to: A group’s protective shield fails when the setting redefines its members as outsiders; Trust-based agency relationships fail when the principal cannot exit or evaluate. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 55
- QUESTION: Worth chasing: how does the club enforce against already-expelled members who shun or are shunned — the self-help that makes expulsion still meaningful despite the end-game problem?
Broader Connections
- A group’s protective shield fails when the setting redefines its members as outsiders
#corroborates(0.75) - Trust-based agency relationships fail when the principal cannot exit or evaluate.
#corroborates(0.75) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 55