Elites design insulated constitutions to lock in favorable property-rights treatment

Evidence

An important aspect of insulation concerns the protection of property rights against expropriation, an issue heavily emphasized by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). One can think of this issues in two ways. The rich (or, say, a racially defined fraction of the rich) can guarantee themselves favorable treatment by choosing insulated constitutions knowing that they would always hold control of political offices. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 184

Categorization

• XREF: Echoes the racial-fraction elite-competition model (Bates, Alesina-Baqir-Easterly on ethnically defined public goods).
• SEED: Angle: how constitutional ‘insulation’ (central banks, courts, supermajorities) functions as a property-rights insurance policy written by those who expect to keep power.