Elite tactical units signal the masses’ passivity, not their combativeness.

Evidence

The relationship which existed in 1917-18 between the commando units and the army as a whole can lead, and has led, political leaders to draw up erroneous plans of campaign. They forget: 1. that the commandos are simple tactical units, and do indeed presuppose an army which is not very effective—but not one which is completely inert. For even though discipline and fighting spirit have slackened to the point where a new tactical deployment has become advisable, they still do exist to a certain degree—a degree to which the new tactical formation precisely corresponds. Otherwise there could only be rout, and headlong flight; 2. that the phenomenon of commandos should not be considered as a sign of the general combativity of the mass of the troops, but, on the contrary, as a sign of their passivity and relative demoralisation. — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 882

Categorization

• XREF: This maps onto Gramsci’s own framework of war of position vs. war of movement, and connects forward to how vanguardist/insurrectionist models understate mass passivity — directly relevant to how Islamophobia readings treat grassroots mobilization vs. elite manipulation.