Elected judges may rationally impose biased sentences to match voters’ crime concerns

Evidence

Consider the following example. Assume three things: one, that the judge is elected from a mostly White district; two, that recidivism rates (i.e., rates of reoffending after leaving prison) are higher among convicted Black criminals; and, three, that voters are concerned about crime. In this situation, an elected judge who “represents voter preferences” is expected to assign longer prison sentences to Black defendants both to incapacitate them (in prison) and to deter them from recidivism (with stiffer punishment). This, of course, is a violation of fair and equal treatment, but it could be the optimal decision for a judge wanting to be re-elected. In this situation, it is the voters who de facto determine how the law should be interpreted. — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 792

Categorization

Category: Causal Relationships

• SEED: Article angle: ‘electoral accountability as a structural driver of judicial bias’ — that punishing a judge for softness on crime converts voter preferences directly into sentencing disparities, even without any animus on the judge’s part.
• XREF: Connects to the logic of Milgrom’s findings that institutions arise where incentives misalign, and to public-choice theory about elected officials’ accountability incentives.
• DEEPTHINKING: The example shows fair sentencing and re-election incentives can be structurally incompatible — the judge faces a genuine dilemma where either choice is a genuine cost.

Related

• Electoral incentives can push judges toward racially disparate sentencing (similarity 0.94)
• Impending elections make trial judges sentence criminal defendants more harshly (similarity 0.87)
• Elected judges face re-election pressure that can push decisions away from law (similarity 0.81)
• Elected judges may bend rulings toward voter preferences to secure re-election. (similarity 0.81)