Electoral incentives can push judges toward racially disparate sentencing

Evidence

Consider the following example. Assume three things: one, that the judge is elected from a mostly White district; two, that recidivism rates (i.e., rates of reoffending after leaving prison) are higher among convicted Black criminals; and, three, that voters are concerned about crime. In this situation, an elected judge who “represents voter preferences” is expected to assign longer prison sentences to Black defendants both to incapacitate them (in prison) and to deter them from recidivism (with stiffer punishment). This, of course, is a violation of fair and equal treatment, but it could be the optimal decision for a judge wanting to be re-elected. In this situation, it is the voters who de facto determine how the law should be interpreted. — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 792

Categorization

• SEED: Essay angle: ‘structural’ racial bias in sentencing that operates through democratic accountability rather than any judge’s animus — the electorate, not the bench, de facto interprets law.
• XREF: Connects to reader’s solidarity/enemy-threat work in that threat perceptions (crime fear among voters) manufacture a constructed external enemy that shapes institutional outputs. — connects to: Impending elections make trial judges sentence criminal defendants more harshly — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 431; Voter backlash can remove judges who sit on cases involving their benefactors — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 584; Retention defeats require organized opposition campaigns against judges — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 609
• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law: A Definitive Look at…, 792