Doing requires an in-itself indifferent to the action performed on it

Evidence

There is one fact which makes this necessity what it is: grounding itself, necessity is never its own ground, but conversely experiences itself as radically passive in relation to itself. Although it has its source within itself it feels this to be independent of itself. Necessity forgets its own origin. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1107 (#expands, via linked claim)

If we wish to resolve these difficulties, we must take into account what is required of an existent if it is to be considered as a totality: it is necessary that the diversity of its structures be held within a unitary synthesis in such a way that each of them considered apart is only an abstraction. And certainly consciousness considered apart is only an abstraction; but the in-itself has no need of the for-itself in order to be; the “passion” of the for-itself only causes there to be in-itself. The phenomenon of in-itself is an abstraction without consciousness but its being is not an abstraction. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1439 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Necessity forgets that its own activity posited its passivity — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1107; The in-itself has no need of the for-itself to be — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1439; Sensation requires an object other than the sense acting on it

Broader Connections

• Necessity forgets that its own activity posited its passivity #expands (0.85) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1107
• The in-itself has no need of the for-itself to be #corroborates (0.78) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1439
• Sensation requires an object other than the sense acting on it #exemplifies (0.72)