Divided government and partisan payback slash judicial confirmation rates, leaving many vacancies.

Evidence

Divided government typically means that nominees undergo more critical scrutiny. In addition, Republican senators were more than willing to “pay back” Democrats for the harsh treatment given to Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas by the Democratic-controlled Senate when they were nominated for the Supreme Court by Presidents Reagan and Bush. Thus, whereas more than 90 percent of Clinton’s nominees for the lower federal courts were confirmed from 1993 to 1994, when the Democrats controlled the Senate, only 70 percent were confirmed from 1995 through 1996, 80 percent from 1997 through 1998, and 61 percent from 1999 through 2000. During 1996, confirmations slowed to a trickle as the Senate refused even to consider Democratic nominees, hoping for a Republican victory in the 1996 presidential race. After the election, conflict between Clinton and Republicans in the Senate continued to stall consideration of judicial nominees; and the process was further slowed during the impeachment of President Clinton by the House of Representatives and his trial in the Senate. With the prospect of a new president, the Senate in 2000 confirmed only 37 nominees, leaving 57 vacant seats on federal district courts and 25 on appeals courts when George W. Bush was inaugurated in 2001. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 688

Categorization

• XREF: Quantifies how the shared president/Senate appointment power from chapter 31 plays out under divided government. — connects to: Constitutional design gives the president and Senate shared federal judicial appointment power — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 646; Filibusters and recess appointments weaponize judicial confirmation procedures — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 513; Divided government and lame-duck presidencies predict Supreme Court confirmation failure — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 543 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Judicial votes systematically divide along liberal and conservative lines #expands (0.82) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2579