Democratic equality derives meaning only from its correlate of possible inequality

Evidence

His argument is that democracy requires a conception of equality as substance, and cannot satisfy itself with abstract conceptions like the liberal one, since ‘equality is only interesting and invaluable politically so long as it has substance, and for that reason at least the possibility and the risk of inequality’. In order to be treated as equals, citizens must, he says, panake of a common substance. — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 167

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes Schmitt’s substantive equality from liberal abstract equality — central to the reader’s enemy/adversary distinction question.
• ADDENDUM: Relevant to the reader’s pieces on moral panics over identity/dress and sacrifice as boundary constitution — common substance as the marker of who belongs to the demos.
• QUESTION: Could a pluralist ‘we’ be built on something other than shared substance, e.g. shared procedures or shared agonistic commitment?
• XREF: connects to: Democratic equality cannot exist without a correlate of inequality and exclusion — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 173; Democracy depends on recognizing politically unequal differences — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 2692

Broader Connections

• Democratic equality cannot exist without a correlate of inequality and exclusion #corroborates (0.97) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 173
• Democracy depends on recognizing politically unequal differences #expands (0.74) — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 2692