Decisions against one’s will arise from situational confluence, not rational deliberation

Evidence

But how does one come to make a “decision” that goes against one’s will? One does not do so, Beauvoir’s account suggests, only or even primarily through a process of clear reasoning and dispassionate judgment. For one is carried toward one’s fi nal judgment by the confl uence of many aspects of one’s situation that are not the object of one’s rational deliberations. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 489

Categorization

• XREF: This alignment of Beauvoir’s account with situated, non-deliberative decision-making connects to her ethics of ambiguity and the existentialist emphasis on situated freedom over Cartesian rational choice. — connects to: Border situations force whole-being choices that abstract thought cannot resolve — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 274; Political deliberation differs from philosophical conversation because decision deadlines constrain it — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 97; Situated forces, not external indifference, shape Henri’s political decisions. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 486 (+6 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: Dense claim about decision theory contradicting rational-choice models from within an existentialist framework — the situation carries the agent toward judgment rather than reasons determining it.

Broader Connections

• Freedom and situation are mutually constituting rather than opposites #corroborates (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1164
• Free will that succumbs to evil influence is self-contradictory #qualifies (0.75)
• Being rational, informed, and in control is not always strategic #corroborates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 52
• Opinion arguments rationalize decisions rather than explain how they are reached. #expands (0.72) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 408
• Rational choice models miss that trust is decided without probabilistic knowledge at decision time #corroborates (0.72) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 147