Counterfeit originally referred to setting in opposition, not making false imitations
Evidence
In this book each chapter is a watermark of sorts, shaded to provide tonal depth and temperament, to render imperial governance and its dispositions in bolder relief. Watermarking techniques were fashioned for the privileged, with tools that engraved their rights and bore their stamp. Those that emboss these pages were tools of the privileged but engraved with impressions that were sometimes used to other ends. Unlike watermarks that protect against counterfeit versions, these chapters take up another sense of counterfeit that does the opposite. From the same thirteenthcentury moment in the social etymology of “counterfeit” emerges a contrary sense—one that partakes of a critical stance. It is not the false or imitative that carries the weight of meaning but that derived from “contrafactio”—the “setting in opposition or contrast.” It is this play on the oppositional that these watermarks embrace. The only “counterfeits” they stamp against are those that argue that there are no watermarks and there was no stamp, simply because light has been cast with darker shadows in other, more commanding directions. — Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain_ Epistemic…, 71
Categorization
- DEFINE: Etymology of ‘counterfeit’ from ‘contrafactio’ meaning ‘setting in opposition or contrast’ rather than falsity.
- XREF: Relates to the broader epistemic project of reading silences and absence in archives against the claim that nothing was hidden. — connects to: Legal European status contradicted the label of imitation Europeans — Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain_ Epistemic…, 654; Neapolitan law punished theft more harshly than counterfeiting which attacks public trust
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain_ Epistemic…, 71
Broader Connections
- Legal European status contradicted the label of imitation Europeans
#corroborates(0.60) — Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain_ Epistemic…, 654