Costly signaling and CRED theories complement rather than contradict.
Related
- Trust reduces transaction costs the way lubricant reduces friction (similarity 0.84)
- Information content is defined by surprise or improbability, not repetition (similarity 0.84)
- Trust is merely evidence-based expectation while trustworthiness is motivational (similarity 0.83)
- Costly displays distinguish sincere believers from fakers (similarity 0.83)
- Trust necessarily stays moored in expectations and interests (similarity 0.82)
- Specific meaning arises only from an arbitrary contingent break (similarity 0.82)
- Representation and misrepresentation differ only by degree within a shared field of discourse. (similarity 0.81)
- Trust cannot be paired with obligation as promises are (similarity 0.81)
- Deceitful trust, once established, obliges its user into genuine trustworthiness (similarity 0.81)
- Institutional and legal constraints give people strong external incentives to be trustworthy (similarity 0.81)
- Information content of a signal is measured by its probability of occurrence (similarity 0.81)
- So-called objective accounts encode the standpoint of the powerful (similarity 0.81)
- Trust relationships must be built gradually through small steps because of environmental contingency. (similarity 0.81)
- Trusting values depend crucially on the information each party holds (similarity 0.81)
- Trust grows out of the specific relationship between the parties (similarity 0.81)