Cooperation fails if no one can knowingly occupy a dependent party

Evidence

In these conflicts, between the jester Rigoletto and the Duke of Mantua and between Iago and his general, Othello, the weaker men turn on the more powerful. That we might not trust those who have power over us, especially when they have little reason to care for us individually, is no surprise. I depend heavily on your favor, while you depend not at all on mine. You can therefore do me substantial harm, while I can do you little or none. The mutual trust that depends on reciprocal relations cannot easily develop in such unequal, nonreciprocal contexts. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 477 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Pateman shows agreement between unequal parties is inherently suspect; Cooperation requires at least one party’s essential action beyond the other’s control.; Cooperation-focused strategies fail where conditions for cooperation are themselves absent (+3 more)

Related

• Mutual trust cannot develop in unequal, nonreciprocal power relations (similarity 0.86)
• Voluntary agreement is impossible between parties of unequal power (similarity 0.86)
• Power inequalities block trust because the strong lack encapsulated interest (similarity 0.83)
• Loss of positional power can void the sanction backing a trust relationship (similarity 0.82)
• Cooperation requires trust as assurance against defection by non-dependent parties (similarity 0.81)
• No consistent analytical case exists for trust beyond encapsulated interest (similarity 0.81)
• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation (similarity 0.80)
• Trust requires assurance that is at least somewhat well based (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions. (similarity 0.79)
• Cooperation requires knowing others’ motives and being believed trustworthy (similarity 0.79)
• Cooperative equilibria require conditional trust, not blind trust or blind distrust (similarity 0.79)
• Trust only arises where opportunistic behavior is genuinely possible (similarity 0.79)
• Trust requires both freedom to defect and constraints that make cooperation attractive (similarity 0.78)
• Cooperation-focused strategies fail where conditions for cooperation are themselves absent (similarity 0.78)
• Cooperation only becomes a theoretical puzzle when one party depends on another. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Cooperation-focused strategies fail where conditions for cooperation are themselves absent #expands (0.82)
• Mutual trust cannot develop in unequal, nonreciprocal power relations #corroborates (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 477
• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation #contradicts (0.75)