Contemporary concepts get meanings by convention, not by ideal form

Evidence

In some of the claims for these visions of trust as unrelated to knowledge, and for other extrarational visions of trust, the move seems to be definitional. This sounds like an essentialist claim that trust is X, as though we were returning to the worst aspects of Platonic philosophy and seeking ideal forms. We tend instead to think of contemporary notions, such as trust, as having their meanings set by convention, not by some ideal form. In an explanatory theory, we try to explain a range of behaviors that have closely related parts. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 342

Categorization

• XREF: Hardin’s anti-essentialism echoes the pragmatist/social-constructivist turn in concept theory, aligning with Luhmann’s systems theory of meaning as convention-dependent. — connects to: Concepts are reflections that explain things through context beyond immediate experience — Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the…, 423; Meaning arises from interdependence in difference, not from data or content. — Nick Couldry & Ulises A. Mejias, The Costs of Connection: How Data Is…, 622; Forgotten origins make arbitrary conventions feel like nature’s order — W. David Marx, Status and Culture: How Our Desire for…, 131 (+1 more)