Constitutions written when voting rights were narrow protect property from redistribution

Evidence

Empirically, this implies that older Constitutions, chosen when voting rights were restricted to a fraction of wealthy men, should prescribe larger majorities (i.e. be less insulated) when it comes to taxation and protection of property against redistributional reforms. … Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) note that “in a sample of 16 OECD countries, the correlation between social spending and the year of the most recent constitution is 0.52”. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 189

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to arguments about the US welfare state’s stinginess relative to Europe, e.g. comparative political economy work on American exceptionalism. — connects to: Constitutions entrench policies through structure and rights much as legislation and elections do — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 462
• QUESTION: How much of that 0.52 correlation survives controls for economic development, federalism, and ethnic heterogeneity?