Consensus in scientific observation presupposes socially standardized expectations of behaviour.
Evidence
Whether a basic statement was adequately motivated by experience could be decided by a provisional and constantly retractable consensus of all the observers taking part in attempts to falsify specific theories. But the necessity for consensus pointed to an orientation towards socially standardized forms of expected behaviour. The character of the experimental conditions and the character of the hypothetical laws (conditional prognoses as to observable behaviour) suggested, according to Habermas, a particular pragmatistic interpretation of the process of discovery analysed by Popper, namely interpreting it as forming part of the sphere of activity of labour within society. — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 600
Categorization
- DEFINE: Oddly names Popper’s ‘basic statements’ without a gloss; the italicized convention here marks a term being introduced for technical use, not emphasis.
- XREF: Connects to Kuhn’s paradigm-conditioned observation and to the Frankfurt School’s claim that the technical knowledge interest’s value-basis was forgotten through capitalist modernization. — connects to: Social consensus precedes individual competence in judgment — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 268; People discount their own sense evidence to conform to group consensus — Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth, 89; Science’s trustworthiness rests on being intersubjective and collective — Holm Gero Hümmler, Ulrike Schiesser, Fact and Prejudice: How to Communicate…, 748 (+1 more)
- yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: Social consensus precedes individual competence in judgment — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 268; People discount their own sense evidence to conform to group consensus — Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth, 89; Science’s trustworthiness rests on being intersubjective and collective — Holm Gero Hümmler, Ulrike Schiesser, Fact and Prejudice: How to Communicate…, 748 (+1 more)