Agreement in judgments stems from shared human nature, not just shared beliefs

Evidence

It is also contingent, surely, upon our own constitution. It is we who must cope with this environment - human beings with a common nature which guarantees a considerable overlap in perspec­ tive even among members of very different societies. It is this which Wittgenstein seems to have in mind in the preceding remark (where, incidentally, he also rejects a consensus theory of truth): ‘“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.’ Agreement in judgements is not simply a matter of shared beliefs but of shared nature. What Wittgenstein meant by ‘form of life’ is complex and controversial, but it is reasonably clear, I think, that the expression refers not so much (as is often thought) to the practices specific to a particular society, but to conduct flowing from our human constitution itself. — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, 419

Categorization

  • XREF: Places Wittgenstein’s ‘form of life’ against the common relativist/constructionist reading — directly relevant to the field’s standard treatment of language-games as society-specific. — connects to: Interpreting others presupposes shared rationality and a common world. — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist…, 420; Persuasion within a moral tradition depends on shared background assumptions — Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival…, 1198; Consensual beliefs gain perceived validity and social connection from being shared (+2 more)
  • DEFINE: Clarifies that ‘form of life’ for Callinicos refers to conduct from human constitution, countering the usual society-specific practices reading.
  • SEED: Angle: a corrective essay on how ‘form of life’ got misappropriated by cultural-relativist postmodern theory when Wittgenstein meant shared nature.

Broader Connections