Conscience resolves conflicts only at the final unreasoning act, never arbitrating between modalities.

Evidence

My belief is that there is such a role, but it is distinct from that played when the modalities conflict. Suppose, for example, that there is conflicting historical evidence about the intent evidenced by a certain revision at the Constitutional Convention. Madison’s notes suggest one set of facts; other accounts differ from this. Once the decider has conscientiously applied the canons of historical judgment to no avail, she must resort to conscience, by which I mean the unreasoning decision itself. The difference between this situation and that of a conflict between (or among) the modalities, rather than within a single one, is that some fact-iu the example given, the discovery of clarifying notes that resolve the conflict-can always appear to bring harmony within a modality, whereas no fact can accomplish this among different forms of argument. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 515

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies the author’s specific sense of ‘resort to conscience’ as the unreasoning decision itself, distinct from reasoned assessment within a modality.
• XREF: Connects to dispute-resolution theory and the distinction between first-order rules and adjudication of rule conflicts (Hart, Dworkin on hard cases).

Related

• Bobbitt’s appeal to conscience is not an escape hatch from the modalities. (similarity 0.83)