Congress weaponizes new judgeship creation to favor the appointing president’s party

Evidence

Vacancies can also occur when Congress creates new judgeships. Although the Supreme Court has had nine justices since 1869, caseload pressures have forced Congress to increase the number of district court and appeals court judges periodically. In fact, since the late nineteenth century, the number of federal judges has doubled approximately every 30 years. As of 2009, there were 679 district court judges and 179 appeals court judges. Adding large numbers of positions at one time can drastically alter the composition of the federal bench, and so political factors may affect Congress’s timing in creating new judgeships. During the 1970s, the Democratic-controlled Congress delayed adding judgeships until there was a Democratic president to appoint the judges. After the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, Congress passed the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, creating 152 new positions. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 462

Categorization

• XREF: Exemplifies the systemic political dimension of the federal bench studied throughout the course. — connects to: Most appeals court judges were politically active in the appointing president’s party — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 471; Judges act as temporally extended representatives of their appointing party.; Political selection fills the courts with judges holding established partisan views — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2571 (+8 more)
• SEED: The strategic timing of judgeship creation is an underappreciated lever of judicial composition worth an article.

Broader Connections

• Judges act as temporally extended representatives of their appointing party. #expands (0.90)
• Judicial appointments extend presidential influence far beyond a term #expands (0.88) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 511
• Most appeals court judges were politically active in the appointing president’s party #expands (0.85) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 471
• Judicial appointments extend a party’s influence beyond its control of elected branches. #expands (0.82) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 341
• Actual district court selection gives Senators appointment power despite Senate rarely rejecting nominees #complicates (0.80) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 467
• Political selection fills the courts with judges holding established partisan views #corroborates (0.78) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2571
• Filibusters and recess appointments weaponize judicial confirmation procedures #qualifies (0.75) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 513
• Judicial independence lets appointed justices shed partisanship and change their views #complicates (0.72) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 539
• A justice’s rulings can depart radically from what the appointing president expected #complicates (0.72) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 752