Judges act as temporally extended representatives of their appointing party.
Evidence
Social scientists and legal scholars alike have recognized that politicians can entrench their policies and protect their hold on power by delegating decisionmaking authority to a politically insulated judiciary. Thus, working within a public choice paradigm, William Landes and Richard Posner famously argued that an independent judiciary was a useful tool for legislators who wanted to deliver statutory benefits for interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions and political support. By enforcing the initial bargains against downstream legislatures with political incentives to renege, Landes and Posner argued, courts could increase the durability—and thus the value—of these interest group bargains. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 334 (
#builds-on, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: An insulated judiciary raises the durability and value of legislative bargains. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 334; Legal rules become binding only when supporters hold enforcement power — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 471; Federal judges serve extremely long tenures averaging twenty years or more. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 461 (+5 more)