Confirmation bias makes conspiracism rise among the political out-group

Evidence

The third cognitive element behind conspiracism is confirmation bias. We look for facts that fit our preconceptions of how the world works. We assimilate new information that confirms what we already think and discard contradictory information. Confirmation bias propels us to harmonize what we hear and learn to what we know, or think we know. A standard illustration is the partisan differential in how people take in and interpret information. After Trump persistently trumpeted that “if you deduct the millions of people who voted illegally,” he had actually won the popular vote, “a plurality of Republicans sa[id] President Donald Trump received more of the popular vote.” In this respect, a standard proposition holds that conspiracism is “largely a function of political attachment.” Other studies show that conspiracism is embraced by partisans of the Left and Right depending on who is in and who is out of power. In one study, Democrats “who agreed on average with the conspiracy claims” proposed by researchers “increased from 27% before the election [of 2016] to 32% afterwards.” To take another example, Glenn Beck’s radio show, which peddled charges of left-wing conspiracy, was popular when Democrats controlled the government in 2008; the show was canceled as irrelevant when Republicans regained control in 2010. — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying, 118

Categorization

• XREF: Out-group conspiracism dynamic ties to chapter 1’s account of who tells conspiracy stories; also resonates with the motivated-reasoning literature beyond this book. — connects to: Conspiratorial belief is driven by minority status and anomia, not just white politics — Anna Merlan, Republic of Lies, 144; Political losing raises a group’s propensity for conspiratorial reasoning rather than causing it — Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph M. Parent, American Conspiracy Theories, 756; Partisan identity skews which conspiracist claims people credit — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New…, 36 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Political losing raises a group’s propensity for conspiratorial reasoning rather than causing it #expands (0.85) — Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph M. Parent, American Conspiracy Theories, 756
• Out-of-power domestic groups generate most conspiratorial talk #corroborates (0.80) — Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph M. Parent, American Conspiracy Theories, 699
• Partisan identity skews which conspiracist claims people credit #corroborates (0.78) — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying, 36