Conceptual puzzles about ‘the law’ and ‘legal obligation’ become acute when a court is confronted with a problem like this.

Evidence

Think of the major premise that should control. In all cases in which “X” set of facts appeared, courts applied “Y” rule of law and drew “Z” conclusion. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 751 (#expands, via linked claim)

The ability to study law depends upon the power of seeing logical connections in the cases, of recognizing similarities and dissimilarities. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 210 (#responds-to, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim
  • XREF: connects to: Take the old jurisprudential chestnut, discussed briefly in The Nature of the Judicial Process, whether a ‘murdering heir’ shall be allowed to inherit. The wills statute allows testators who comply with certain formalities to leave their property to whomever they please. There is no exception for the eventuality in which the beneficiary named in the will murders the testator. Should such an exception be interpolated by the courts? The answer, to the pragmatist, depends on the consequences.; These are not puzzles for the cupboard, to be taken down on rainy days for fun. They are sources of continuing embarrassment, and they nag at our attention. They embarrass us in dealing with particular problems that we must solve, one way or another. Suppose a novel right-of-privacy case comes to court, and there is no statute or precedent either granting or denying the particular right of anonymity claimed by the plaintiff. What role in the court’s decision should be played by the fact that most people in the community think that private individuals are ‘morally’ entitled to that particular privacy?; Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such persons as having broken the law or having failed to meet their legal obligations, or having interfered with other people’s legal rights. Even in clear cases (a bank robber or a willful breach of contract), when we are confident that someone had a legal obligation and broke it, we are not able to give a satisfactory account of what that means, or why that entitles the state to punish or coerce him. We may feel confident that what we are doing is proper, but until we can identify the principles we are following we cannot be sure that they are sufficient, or whether we are applying them consistently. In less clear cases, when the issue of whether an obligation has been broken is for some reason controversial, the pitch of these nagging questions rises, and our responsibility to find answers deepens. (+4 more)

Broader Connections