Compartmentalization, not the ring’s invisibility, makes crimes permissible

Evidence

“The ring of Gyges that has itself become invisible—that is precisely in what consists the act of setting apart. It is setting apart oneself and the crime one commits; not establishing the connection between the two.” What Gyges says is, “I have become king and the other king has been assassinated. The two things are totally unrelated. Here is the ring.” One sets something aside and forgets that one has set it aside, one compartmentalizes—and “that faculty of setting apart makes all crimes permissible.” — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 429

Categorization

• DEFINE: Reframes the Gyges myth: the invisible thing is the ring (the act of setting apart), making compartmentalization the mechanism of permissibility.
• SEED: Essay angle: compartmentalization as the modern moral technology enabling remote killing, grounded in Weil’s rereading of Plato.
• XREF: connects to: Invisible compartmentalization, not invisibility itself, makes crimes permissible; Confinement of sanctioned violence to places was meant to circumscribe it — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 252; Legal legitimacy is structural contingency, not shared conviction

Related

• Invisible compartmentalization, not invisibility itself, makes crimes permissible (similarity 0.86)

Broader Connections

• Legal legitimacy is structural contingency, not shared conviction #corroborates (0.80)
• Confinement of sanctioned violence to places was meant to circumscribe it #expands (0.45) — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 252