Community-norm trust does not encapsulate another’s interests

Evidence

Therefore, many of the things that one could have “trusted” Vronsky to do are different from the kinds of sequential exchange that can be modeled by the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Someone’s “trust” in him would be a two-part intentional relation, because it would depend on Vronsky’s intentional and arguably rational commitments. These would not be with respect to a particular other individual (such as his specific gambling partner of this evening), however, but with respect to the whole aristocratic community as the enforcer of its norms. He would not be motivated by concern with the interests of the person to whom he owes a debt but only with the possibility of enforcement of the communal norms. Hence his stance would not justify anyone in trusting him in the strong sense of supposing his interests directly encapsulated theirs. The second part of the two-part relation would be the range of things covered by the aristocratic norms. Vronsky’s commitments were simply rational if Vronsky adhered to the code just in case it fitted his interests to do so. In choosing among debts to pay, he paid his fellow noble gambler, who could harm him socially or otherwise, rather than his tailor, who could only hassle him and refuse him further service. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 268

Categorization

• XREF: Precisely distinguishes ‘encapsulated interests’ trust (Hardin’s strong sense) from community-norm-based reliance — the core of the reader’s Saramago integration.
• DEFINE: Defines the two-part intentional structure of community-driven trust and contrasts it with encapsulated-interest trust.