Communists and the Algiers lobby made any liberal Algerian policy impossible in the Assembly.

Evidence

In the Assembly the solid Communist bloc, representing a fairly steady fifth of the electorate, was an ever-present ingredient in the paralysis of any consistent policy. Together with the extremists of the Right, their presence meant that consensus required the support of almost all other factions combined, and there were seldom issues simple or clear enough for this. Thus, repeatedly, a tiny minority of Poujadists and the “Algiers lobby” of maybe no more than ten deputies would suffice to swing an anti-reformist vote on Algeria. As Alfred Grosser notes in his La IVe République et sa politique extérieure, the essential tragedy of the French liberal conscience at this time was this: “To bring liberty to overseas people, there is no majority without Communists. But to defend the liberties that Communism seeks to destroy, the only majority is with those who refuse liberty to Asians and Africans….” — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 749

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in how the French Revolution’s liberty ideals were fought back — the Grosser paradox directly extends that thread. — connects to: De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957; The French Left’s inaction eliminated any liberal alternative for Algeria’s Europeans — Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, 568; De Gaulle’s 1958 elections crushed Communist representation in the Assembly — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 956

Related

• De Gaulle’s 1958 elections crushed Communist representation in the Assembly (similarity 0.86)
• Algeria’s liberal European third force collapsed once the French Left aligned with settler fascism. (similarity 0.84)
• The French Left’s inaction eliminated any liberal alternative for Algeria’s Europeans (similarity 0.83)
• The Left’s abortive strike showed it could not mount a counter-coup (similarity 0.82)
• A liberal colonia could have kept Europeans in independent Algeria. (similarity 0.80)
• Algerian integration was only ever workable before 1958 (similarity 0.80)
• The Algerian Communist Party sided with French settlers rather than Muslim nationalists (similarity 0.80)
• Algeria’s moderate third force was crushed between the F.L.N. and the O.A.S. (similarity 0.80)
• The moderate French Left chose de Gaulle over facing civil war with paratroops (similarity 0.80)
• European liberal intellectuals in Algeria faced impossible conscience conflicts as the war radicalized. (similarity 0.80)
• France’s refusal to restrain settler fascism drove liberal Algerians to the F.L.N. (similarity 0.80)
• No genuinely independent left existed among Algeria’s European democrats before the revolution (similarity 0.80)
• De Gaulle won an 80 percent Yes vote in the September 1958 referendum (similarity 0.79)
• De Gaulle restructured Algerian governance into a two-tier hierarchy to tighten control. (similarity 0.79)
• Algeria was only one element of de Gaulle’s larger ambitions. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• The French Left’s inaction eliminated any liberal alternative for Algeria’s Europeans #corroborates (0.75) — Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, 568
• De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress #expands (0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957
• De Gaulle’s 1958 elections crushed Communist representation in the Assembly #complicates (0.50) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 956