Common people hold beliefs by faith in their group, not by reasoned argument

Evidence

The most important element is undoubtedly one whose character is determined not by reason but by faith. But faith in whom, or in what? In particular in the social group to which he belongs, in so far as in a diffuse way it thinks as he does. The man of the people thinks that so many like-thinking people can’t be wrong, not so radically, as the man he is arguing against would like him to believe; he thinks that, while he himself, admittedly, is not able to uphold and develop his arguments as well as the opponent, in his group there is someone who could do this and could certainly argue better than the particular man he has against him; and he remembers, indeed, hearing expounded, discursively, coherently, in a way that left him convinced, the reasons behind his faith. He has no concrete memory of the reasons and could not repeat them, but he knows that reasons exist, because he has heard them expounded, and was convinced by them. The fact of having once suddenly seen the light and been convinced is the permanent reason for his reasons persisting, even if the arguments in its favour cannot be readily produced. — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 1220

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the mechanism by which subaltern philosophy operates as ‘faith in the social group’ rather than individual reasoning.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s scaffolding toolkit: this is the micro-mechanism of how hegemony sustains itself in common sense, preparing for the Islamophobia readings on how widely held assumptions persist against argument. — connects to: Moral courage requires believing one’s group can make a difference — Nina Eliasoph, Avoiding politics: how Americans…, 1087
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: does Gramsci’s ‘man of the people’ logic assume the group’s views are the dominant ones, or does it also hold for minority belief under pressure?