Co-opting a grievance party into government stripped it of its protest function

Evidence

Even more important was the integration policy pursued by the CDU towards the BHE refugee party. The Christian Democrats tried to keep the expellee party within its reach by making generous concessions. Since the summer of 1952, talks had been underway in Bonn proposing that BHE chairman Waldemar Kraft should serve as ‘federal minister for expellee affairs’ in an effort to steer the BHE towards the CDU at the federal and state levels. Adenauer managed to override inner-party opposition after the federal elections of 1953 and include the BHE in his government coalition, awarding it two cabinet positions. He was well aware that both BHE ministers, OberlĂ€nder and Kraft, had a Nazi past. By outsourcing its authority in expellee affairs to a small coalition partner, however, the CDU effectively deprived the BHE of its ability to distinguish itself as an independent protest party. — Manuel Borutta and Jan C. Jansen, Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar
, 744

Categorization

  • XREF: Core to the reader’s question about what happens to group solidarity when institutions absorb the grievance rather than fight it — compares with co-optation of protest movements in other cases. — connects to: Once expellees integrated, their protests lost power to influence party loyalties — Manuel Borutta and Jan C. Jansen, Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar
, 760; Democratic co-optation destroyed the original Populist party — Arthur Borriello and Anton JĂ€ger, The Populist Moment: The Left After the
, 63; Mainstream parties countered the BHE threat by co-opting expellee demands — Manuel Borutta and Jan C. Jansen, Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar
, 85 (+2 more)
  • SEED: Essay angle: co-optation as a strategy that kills protest parties by outbidding them with cabinet posts rather than by defeating them electorally.

Broader Connections