Children activate causal reasoning mainly when observing people use cultural artifacts

Evidence

Research by the developmental psychologists Andrew Meltzoff, Alison Gopnik, and Anna Waismeyer suggests that its exposure to people using artifacts and trying to “do things” that most effectively sparks the causal inference machinery in our minds. Toddlers, for example, will more accurately infer the causal connection between a particular means and a particular end when they observe a person using an artifact than when they observe exactly the same “naturally occurring” physical movements and environmental correlations. That is, children switch their causal inference machinery on in the presence of people actually operating cultural artifacts; the causal models they build help learners better operate the artifact, or engage in the practice, in culturally prescribed ways. — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success, 378

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to reader’s age-timeline question: causal-model induction from intentional artifact use appears by toddlerhood. — connects to: Learners suppress causal reasoning when cultural transmission supplies ready-made models — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture…, 375; Children fixate on objects that violate their specific theories — Brian Christian, The Alignment Problem, 854; Children, unlike chimps, overimitate even when causality is transparent — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture…, 362 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Children, unlike chimps, overimitate even when causality is transparent #complicates (0.82) — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success, 362
• Learners adopt causally opaque cultural practices through implicit trust in accumulated wisdom #complicates (0.82) — Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success, 376
• Children fixate on objects that violate their specific theories #qualifies (0.78) — Brian Christian, The Alignment Problem, 854
• People invoke category-based causal explanations mainly when category salience combines with stereotype fit #expands (0.75) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 118
• People read other minds by applying learned implicit theories about behavior #expands (0.72)