Causal interdependence of welfare is not trust

Evidence

It might also happen that what affects your welfare similarly affects mine, so that I should act de facto in your interest just because the same action would be in my interest. Here, however, we would not want to count me as someone you could trust so much as merely someone from whom you can expect beneficial actions. … If your interest is to do what you do independently of my presence, your interest does not meaningfully encapsulate mine. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 153

Categorization

• DEFINE: Hardin sharply distinguishes trust (encapsulated interest) from mere overlap of interests — the precise boundary that makes the concept analytically useful.
• DEEPTHINKING: This is a precise conceptual cut that separates trust from mere rational alignment — the distinction matters for why Saramago’s blindness scenario (where monitoring collapses) reveals trust’s dependence on observable constraints.