Binding oneself can paradoxically strengthen one’s bargaining position

Evidence

The essence of these tactics is some voluntary but irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice. They rest on the paradox that the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself; that, in bargaining, weakness is often strength, freedom may be freedom to capitulate, and to burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 60

Categorization

• DEFINE: This is the core definition of Schelling’s commitment tactic — voluntary irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice as strategic strength.
• XREF: Directly maps to the reader’s stated purpose: Godfather-bonds as Schellingian credible commitments, and Milgrom et al.’s private judges as self-binding arbitrators. — connects to: Being unreachable during negotiation strengthens one’s bargaining position — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 71; Self-binding in advance defeats temptation that cannot be resisted at the moment — , A Year of World Stories, 14165; Self-binding as first move lets a present self control a future self (+5 more)

Related

• In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength. (similarity 0.81)
• Being unreachable during negotiation strengthens one’s bargaining position (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Being unreachable during negotiation strengthens one’s bargaining position #expands (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 71
• Self-binding in advance defeats temptation that cannot be resisted at the moment #exemplifies (0.82) — , A Year of World Stories, 14165
• Extreme acts of self-sacrifice can function as argument rather than abandonment of it #exemplifies (0.80) — Jamal Awil, The Whispering Archive, 569
• Self-binding as first move lets a present self control a future self #expands (0.78)
• First-mover advantage decides bargaining when commitments are costless and binding #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 69
• In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength. #exemplifies (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 130