Beauvoir held that freedom remains irrepressible even under slavery and torture

Evidence

In Pyrrhus and Cinéas Beauvoir argues that “a man can never abdicate his freedom; his claims to renounce it are only a masquerade that he freely performs. Th e slave who obeys chooses to obey, and his choice must be renewed at every moment” (PC, 118). Along this same line, in the context of discussing an executioner’s victim, Beauvoir claims, “if his victim wants to be free, she will remain free even during torture, and struggling and suff ering will only elevate her” (PC, 124). So understood, the oppressive weight of another’s freedom never entirely exhausts mine, and the struggle of slaves and torture victims indicates an irrepressible freedom to resist, a freedom that the torturer can never fully extinguish without bringing about death. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 175

Categorization

• XREF: This aligns Beauvoir’s early position (1944) with Sartre’s view that even in oppression freedom persists — directly relevant to the authorship/influence debate this book is tracking. Connects to the 1947 Ethics of Ambiguity refinement the author mentions. — connects to: Beauvoir diverges from Sartre by excusing the oppressed from willing freedom — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 650; Beauvoir’s interdependence thesis is compatible with her irrepressible freedom — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 182; Beauvoir’s early ethics treats freedom as necessarily directed toward others — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 76 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir diverges from Sartre by excusing the oppressed from willing freedom #qualifies (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 650
• Beauvoir’s interdependence thesis is compatible with her irrepressible freedom #expands (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 182
• Beauvoir holds that individual freedom is realized only through being directed at other existences #expands (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 659
• Beauvoir’s early ethics treats freedom as necessarily directed toward others #expands (0.75) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 76