Beauvoir grounds selfhood in the Other’s gaze where Sartre denies such dependency

Evidence

Whereas Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, will deny that the Other is necessary to me as determining my being-for-itself, Beauvoir affi rms that this is one of the most fundamental truths of the Master-Slave relationship. … What I am going to argue lies at the heart of her relationship to Hegel in this text is the way she reworks the dialectic in the fi eld of gender relations, viewing it as essentially an ambiguous metaphysical construct. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 267

Categorization

• XREF: Directly opposes the Sartrean for-itself ontology in Being and Nothingness; connects to the wider Beauvoir-Sartre authorship debate and to feminist readings of the Other. — connects to: Beauvoir studies contests her subordination to Sartre as a mere follower — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 44; Beauvoir’s embodiment views diverged from Sartre’s from the start — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 119; Beauvoir reframed Sartre’s alienating male Look as a reciprocal female gaze — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 277 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir holds Others as essential, challenging Sartre’s ontological individualism #corroborates (0.90) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 184
• Beauvoir’s situated account of freedom moved Sartre beyond his earlier absolutism #qualifies (0.75) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 46
• Beauvoir diverges from Sartre by excusing the oppressed from willing freedom #exemplifies (0.72) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 650