Beauvoir’s two freedom claims target Sartre and 1940s misreaders separately

Evidence

Addressing what it means for a person to be free, Beauvoir states quite emphatically both that the Other should not be understood as limiting my freedom and that being free doesn’t mean that one is always able to do what one wants. While I take the fi rst claim to be an implicit criticism of Sartre’s own onesided focus on the constraining role played by the Other in the exercise of one’s freedom, the second claim seems to be aimed more at a very prevalent misreading of Being and Nothingness by several 1940s proponents as well as detractors, insofar as these latter interpreted Sartre’s work, and existentialism more generally, as giving unlimited license to the individual to dictate the terms of her relationships with others and with her situation. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 633

Categorization

• QUESTION: Which specific 1940s readers misread Sartre as licensing willfulness? The author doesn’t name them — worth chasing for the historiography.
• XREF: connects to: Kruks argues Beauvoir rejected Sartre’s absolute freedom as early as 1940. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 167; Beauvoir’s situated account of freedom moved Sartre beyond his earlier absolutism — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 46; Beauvoir diverges from Sartre by excusing the oppressed from willing freedom — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 650

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir’s situated account of freedom moved Sartre beyond his earlier absolutism #corroborates (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 46
• Beauvoir diverges from Sartre by excusing the oppressed from willing freedom #corroborates (0.72) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 650