Beauvoir’s early ethics treats freedom as necessarily directed toward others

Evidence

Th ough for Beauvoir, like Sartre, transcendence is the mark of human condition, for Beauvoir my being as transcendence is also and necessarily a being for and toward others. Th is truth of freedom, which Beauvoir identifi es as the truth of our bond with others, is neither immediately evident nor immediately experienced as a bond of reciprocity. Like Sartre, Beauvoir indicates that our relationship to the Other is immediately experienced through the dynamics of the look. From her genderneutral perspective of Th e Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir does not yet see the places where the bond is affi rmed, and as affi rmed becomes a means of subjugation. What she does see, however, is that there is a direct relationship between the refusal to affi rm the bond and the forces of oppression. — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 76

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the authorship-influence debate: Beauvoir shares Sartre’s look/dynamics of the Other yet shifts toward reciprocity, a divergence the biography literature tracks. — connects to: Beauvoir’s moral arguments for willing others’ freedom predate Sartre’s — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 578; Beauvoir’s ethical freedom departs from Sartre’s ontological freedom to make morality possible — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 610; Beauvoir founded her ethics on willing effective freedom for all others — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 479 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• Beauvoir holds that individual freedom is realized only through being directed at other existences #corroborates (0.95) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 659
• Beauvoir founded her ethics on willing effective freedom for all others #expands (0.85) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 479
• Beauvoir’s moral arguments for willing others’ freedom predate Sartre’s #expands (0.82) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 578
• Beauvoir’s ethical freedom departs from Sartre’s ontological freedom to make morality possible #expands (0.80) — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre, 610