Baxter argues singular justice theories avoid arbitrariness and inconsistency
Evidence
Likewise, Baxter (2005) begins his examination of ecological justice with a defense of a singular and universal theory of justice against constructivist or contextualist claims. He argues (pp. 62–3) that pluralist theories (such as Warren’s 1997 discussion of moral status) can have the appearance of arbitrary selection, and he supports Callicott’s insistence (1990) that appealing to more than one ethical theory can lead to inconsistency and self-serving conclusions. Baxter is clearly after a singular universally applicable notion of ecological justice that extends distributive considerations to a large part of the natural world, and sees such a singular approach as the only reasonable and sustainable way to ground such an extension. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 562
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Singular universal justice definitions exclude real justice claims — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 564; Open-ended theories inviting unlimited added conditions become unfalsifiable and impractical