Bad faith’s possibility constrains what kind of being man must be.

Evidence

IF we wish to get out of this difficulty, we should examine more closely the patterns of bad faith and attempt a description of them. This description will permit us perhaps to fix more exactly the conditions for the possibility of bad faith; that is, to reply to the question we raised at the outset: “What must be the being of man if he is to be capable of bad faith?” — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 290

Categorization

• DEFINE: Frames the ontological question that motivates the whole inquiry into the being of man.
• XREF: connects to: Bad faith requires the for-itself to both be and not be what it is — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 313; Bad faith requires a being that is not what it is, unlike inert objects — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 312; Gender conflict persists because each sex is its own enemy’s accomplice in bad faith. — Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1970 (+1 more)
• yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: Bad faith requires the for-itself to both be and not be what it is — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 313; Bad faith requires a being that is not what it is, unlike inert objects — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 312; Gender conflict persists because each sex is its own enemy’s accomplice in bad faith. — Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1970 (+1 more)