Attending to self and others inseparably means subjects do not precede their relating.

Evidence

This orientation flows from, and further cultivates a recognition of, interdependency, where the possibilities of life unfold through reliance on (both human and non-human) others, who are similarly reliant themselves. Consequently, care produces what the philosopher Margaret Gilbert (2015) calls ‘joint commitments’. Joint commitments emerge when one’s capacity to navigate the world is co-dependent on this same capacity within others – and so where practices of attending to the self are inextricably also practices of attending to others, and vice versa. For Gilbert, joint commitments are the basic ‘stuff’ of social life. Yet this view of sociality also challenges any notion that subjects can meaningfully precede their relating. Thin civilities may facilitate inclusion in the public sphere and guarantee a private right to differ but they also avoid this more personal politics, whereby both subjecthood and sociality are collectively remade. — Farhan Samanani, Conviviality and its others, 55

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The claim that subjects cannot meaningfully precede their relating, and that care collectively remakes subjecthood and sociality, is a dense reworking of the liberal subject that rewards sitting with.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Farhan Samanani, Conviviality and its others: for a…, 55
• XREF: connects to: Being-for-others requires an internal negation, not an external or in-itself one.; Personal knowing of others may not require face-to-face contact. — Lyn H. Lofland, World of Strangers_ Order and Action in…, 1073

Broader Connections

• Being-for-others requires an internal negation, not an external or in-itself one. #complicates (0.75)
• Personal knowing of others may not require face-to-face contact. #qualifies (0.75) — Lyn H. Lofland, World of Strangers_ Order and Action in…, 1073