Arms-control compliance cannot be verified because decision rules are unobservable and breach means war

Evidence

There is an enforcement difficulty with any agreement on reduction of values of R and B in the mutual interest; it is that each other’s values of R and B may not be observable. They depend—at least to an important extent—on the criteria that will govern future decisions, not solely on the observable, physical mechanics of an alert system. They depend on how long one will wait to be “sure,” and on what risks one will accept in an emergency. Furthermore, failure to keep the agreement, if it leads to anything, leads to war itself; so recriminations and damage suits are out of the question if our model represents all-out war rather than a border scrape or a minor transgression of one partner against another. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 516

Categorization

• XREF: The unobservability of decision rules as an enforcement problem parallels Gambetta’s point that private-protection trust depends on unverifiable intentions and on hostage mechanisms rather than contract; also ties to Schelling’s own credibility/commitment theme. — connects to: International human rights rulings alone cannot force compliance without sustained monitoring and pressure — , The Rod and the Child: A Global History…, 11171; Observable disputes in trade cannot be resolved without verification of the underlying claims — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 68; Cooperation may not suffice to arrest instability in the arms race. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 581 (+1 more)

Related

• Crisis agreements require both a stable solution pattern and verifiable, cheat-proof monitoring (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Unrestricted warfare destroys the mutual confidence needed for any peace #expands (0.85) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 296
• International human rights rulings alone cannot force compliance without sustained monitoring and pressure #corroborates (0.82) — , The Rod and the Child, 11171
• Cooperation may not suffice to arrest instability in the arms race. #corroborates (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 581
• Observable disputes in trade cannot be resolved without verification of the underlying claims #corroborates (0.75) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 68