Aristotle models thought on sensation, both being acts of receiving form

Evidence

This opposition, the difference within activity and the sublation of that difference, is expressed by Aristotle in saying that νς thinks itself in the reception of thought, in those things which have become thought. νς thinks itself through the reception of the thinkable; this thinkable only comes into being as something touching and thinking, it is first engendered when it touches – this is the way it is for thinking, in the activity of thinking. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 467 (#expands, via linked claim)

Thus I have determined a sort of internal space in which certain figures called sensations are formed on the occasion of external stimulations. Since this space is pure passivity. I declare that it suffers its sensations. But I do not thereby mean only that it is the internal environment which serves as matrix for them. I am inspired at present with a biological vision of the world which I borrow for my objective conception of the sensory organ considered, and I claim that this internal space lives its sensation. Thus life is a magical connection which I establish between a passive environment and a passive mode of this environment. The mind does not produce its own sensations and hence they remain exterior to it; but on the other hand, it appropriates them to itself by living them. The unity of the “lived” and the “living” is no longer indeed a spatial juxtaposition nor a relation of content to container; it is a magical inherence. The mind is its own sensations while remaining distinct from them. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 844 (#expands, via linked claim)

Between the processes of sensory perception and those of understanding, the difference lies in the fact that, in the case of sensation, the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the seen, the heard, etc., are outside, … while what knowledge apprehends are the universals, and these are in a sense within the soul itself. That is why a man can think when he wants to, but his sensation does not depend on himself: a sensible object must be there. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 456 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: For Aristotle, thought engenders itself through being touched by the thinkable — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 467; Even abstract thought is built from physical and sensory metaphors — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 728; Sensation involves a magical inherence of lived and living rather than spatial belonging — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 844 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• For Aristotle, thought engenders itself through being touched by the thinkable #expands (0.95) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 467
• Sensation involves a magical inherence of lived and living rather than spatial belonging #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 844
• Thought is self-initiated while sensation requires an external object #contradicts (0.85) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 456
• Even abstract thought is built from physical and sensory metaphors #complicates (0.80) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 728