Aristotle distinguishes alteration that fulfills a subject from alteration that corrupts it.

Evidence

In order to make intelligible the modality of πσειν that is relevant here, Aristotle gives himself the task of isolating a type of alteration (/λλ ωσις) which is not at the same time a corruption (-θρ), which implies a fulfilment rather than a diminution of the subject’s way of being. Now ις matches very closely this definition of an alteration which does not corrupt. For example, the possession of knowledge or science (which draws man from his initial state of ignorance up to the state of the knower, and thus creates an alteration): this is certainly not a measure of deprivation but a change for the better. It is for this reason that Aristotle can say about νς that it is ‘potentially like a ις’. The example of the man who becomes a wise man sheds light on the meaning we must give to ις as in the case of ‘the “ειν of νς’. 2Εις is defined as a degree of δ.ναµις. Πσειν should therefore be understood here as a mode of potentiality: that of ‘thinking’ in so far as it is not actually thinking at the moment. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 414

Categorization

• DEFINE: Galvanizes the key distinction: hexis as non-corrupting alteration, potentially-like-hexis — the precise conceptual tool the reader is tracking for plasticity’s definition.
• XREF: The fulfilment-versus-diminution distinction maps directly onto Malabou’s plasticity as receiving form without being corrupted — connects to her later brain-work on how the brain gives and receives form without losing structural integrity. — connects to: Habit, following Aristotle, is an alteration that does not corrupt but forms spirit. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 428; Change, for Aristotle via Hegel, is internal differentiation rather than decay. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 498; Alteration has a privative and a conserving sense — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 447

Broader Connections

• Change, for Aristotle via Hegel, is internal differentiation rather than decay. #expands (0.80) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 498