Aristotle’s precision itself prevents him from unifying his speculative insights

Evidence

In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel shows how Aristotle, at the very moment when he draws attention to the genuinely speculative principle of subjective self-differentiation (the predicative synthesis), nonetheless posits this difference as something outside the subject, as a sensory multiplicity which cannot be successfully conjoined. The Aristotelian method defines absolute substance as self-differentiating negativity, yet the work of individuation, as it is pursued here, expands until it touches the very limits of indeterminacy and of nothingness. Aristotelian empiricism, celebrated by Hegel for its high speculative content, in fact falls apart into a kind of disorder for which, paradoxically, its acribolic scruples are responsible: The deficiency (Mangel) in the Aristotelian philosophy rests in the fact, that after the manifold of phenomena was through its offices raised into the concept, the latter (i. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1177

Categorization

• QUESTION: Worth chasing: is the claim that methodological scrupulousness (acriboly) actively causes conceptual fragmentation a general mechanism, reusable in other domains?
• XREF: Connects to the plasticity thread where form-reception is bound up with self-differentiation, and to how precision disciplines can undercut their own speculative aims. — connects to: Aristotle raised phenomena into concepts but could not unite them into one absolute concept