Aristotle raised phenomena into concepts but could not unite them into one absolute concept

Evidence

The deficiency (Mangel) in the Aristotelian philosophy rests in the fact, that after the manifold of phenomena was through its offices raised into the concept, the latter (i.e. the concept), however, again fell asunder into a succession of determinate concepts, and the unity, the absolute concept which unites them, was not emphasized. … Hence, the reciprocal determination of subject and predicate, their solid and substantial connection, remains unestablished. The subject extends the sensory manifold towards infinity without ever drawing it together as a whole. Aristotle was unable to think what Hegel would call the ‘adequacy’ of subject and predicate, which demands that ‘the subject that fills its own content ceases to go beyond it, and cannot have any further predicates or accidental properties’. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1178 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel shows how Aristotle, at the very moment when he draws attention to the genuinely speculative principle of subjective self-differentiation (the predicative synthesis), nonetheless posits this difference as something outside the subject, as a sensory multiplicity which cannot be successfully conjoined. The Aristotelian method defines absolute substance as self-differentiating negativity, yet the work of individuation, as it is pursued here, expands until it touches the very limits of indeterminacy and of nothingness. Aristotelian empiricism, celebrated by Hegel for its high speculative content, in fact falls apart into a kind of disorder for which, paradoxically, its acribolic scruples are responsible: The deficiency (Mangel) in the Aristotelian philosophy rests in the fact, that after the manifold of phenomena was through its offices raised into the concept, the latter (i. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1177 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Aristotle failed to unify determinate concepts into an absolute concept — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1178; Aristotle’s precision itself prevents him from unifying his speculative insights — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1177

Broader Connections

• Aristotle failed to unify determinate concepts into an absolute concept #corroborates (0.95) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1178
• Aristotle’s precision itself prevents him from unifying his speculative insights #qualifies (0.75) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1177