Aristotle’s power-act unity and Christian kenosis both express the subject’s plastic temporalization

Evidence

To give sustenance to these claims, we must show how, for Hegel, the same question is posed in two different and separate times. Whether the issue is the idea of kenosis, or the interpretation of the Aristotelian Prime Mover, one and the same project is preoccupying Hegel, that of plasticity, or, to put it another way, the ‘non-impassivity’ of the subject. The philosopher’s insistence on the unity of πσειν and νεργε!ν in Aristotle, just like his analysis of the movement of Entäußerung in the case of the God of Revelation, turns on the same project: how to characterize the subject as a structure of anticipation, and, by the same token, a structure of temporalization. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 918

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines plasticity as ‘non-impassivity’ — the subject as structure of anticipation and temporalization, the very equation this reader is tracking toward the brain.
• XREF: The ‘non-impassivity of the subject’ as anticipation/temporalization maps directly onto the reader’s brain-plasticity project: the plastic subject awaiting its own modification, ready to receive form. — connects to: Aristotle conflates passivity and activity under motion as imperfect activity — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 410; God’s kenosis gives philosophic subjectivity its temporal form; Hegel’s time concept fuses Aristotle’s now-analysis with Kant’s pure form of sensibility — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 255 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Aristotle models thought on sensation, both being acts of receiving form #expands (0.75)
• Hegel’s time concept fuses Aristotle’s now-analysis with Kant’s pure form of sensibility #expands (0.72) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 255